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TELESCOPING AND COLLECTIVIZING RELIGIOUS 
FREE EXERCISE RIGHTS 
HENRY L. CHAMBERS, JR∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution protects an in-
dividual’s right to freely exercise religion against government intrusion.1  
The amendment’s Free Exercise Clause guarantees that persons can express 
their religious devotion as they see fit.  Though protective of free exercise 
rights, the clause is not absolute.  It does not exempt individuals from gen-
erally applicable laws that incidentally limit their exercise of religion.2  
Consequently, in the last few decades, laws such as the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (“RFRA”) and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 
Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) have been enacted to broaden the protection of 
the exercise of religion from governmental interference. 
Under those statutes, a person may stop the federal government and, in 
some instances, state and local governments from engaging in conduct, in-
cluding enforcing laws, that substantially affects the person’s ability to 
freely practice religion, unless the government’s action is triggered by a 
compelling interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering the com-
pelling interest.3  That expansion of the breadth of protection for free exer-
cise rights is important.  If the free exercise of religion is to be encouraged, 
it arguably should not yield every time a statute limits it.4 When an individ-
ual’s exercise of religion is effectively limited by a statute, striking a bal-
ance between the free exercise of religion and the regulation of religious 
conduct is reasonable.  Though RFRA and RLUIPA may appear to simply 
allow an individual to avoid the effect of some laws that conflict with the 
individual’s religious beliefs, arguably those statutes merely provide broad-
                                                          
© 2015 Henry L. Chambers, Jr. 
∗ Professor of Law, University of Richmond. 
 1.  U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”). 
 2.  See Emp’t Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).  
 3.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1(a),(b) (2012); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-1(a) (2012). 
 4.  Cf. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 144–45 (1987) 
(suggesting that government’s accommodation of religious practices is sometimes necessary and 
sensible under the First Amendment); Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334 (1987) (noting that, in some situations, govern-
ment may be required to accommodate an entity’s religious practices). 
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er coverage for the principle of religious autonomy that underlies the First 
Amendment. 
However, First Amendment rights are not strictly limited to individu-
als.  Churches and similar organizations may assert free exercise rights.5  
They can do so in either of two ways.  An organization may serve as a vehi-
cle to assert the free exercise rights of its members.  In such situations, the 
organization’s members telescope their free exercise rights through the or-
ganization.  Alternatively, an organization may amalgamate and collectivize 
the individual free exercise rights of its members and be treated as though 
the organization were asserting its own free exercise rights.  Whether a reli-
gious organization’s exercise of free exercise rights is thought to be based 
on the collectivization or the telescoping of its members’ free exercise 
rights, protection for such rights appears sensible when the organization has 
been created to facilitate the exercise of religious rights and is a primary 
outlet for an individual’s exercise of those religious rights.  Like individu-
als, churches may telescope their free exercise rights through affiliated or-
ganizations.6  The protections of RFRA and the RLUIPA may extend to 
those affiliated religious organizations.7  Consequently, some religious or-
ganizations and their affiliates may have the same latitude to avoid the ef-
fect of some laws as individuals. 
However, courts may be ready to go significantly farther.  In Burwell 
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,8 the Supreme Court applied RFRA to allow 
closely held, for-profit corporations owned by devout Christians to exercise 
religious rights.9   Courts may be ready to allow any organization, if suffi-
ciently imbued with religious faith by the people associated with it, to freely 
exercise religion and block the regulation of its interests by laws that would 
restrict the organization’s free exercise rights.  Whether that result—which 
arguably allows individuals to protect their financial and economic inter-
ests, not merely their spiritual interests—is sensible is not clear. 
If courts are willing to expand religious liberty so that people may be 
allowed to choose—on the basis of their own religious beliefs—whether 
certain laws will apply to non-religious entities they create, those courts 
should take that step very carefully.  This Paper explores the issue and pro-
ceeds as follows.  Part I discusses three recent Supreme Court cases that il-
luminate the telescoping and the collectivization of free exercise rights.  
Part II considers problems that accompany telescoping and collectivizing 
                                                          
 5.  See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 706 
(2012) (noting the First Amendment’s application to religious organizations). 
 6.  See, e.g., Amos, 483 U.S at 330. 
 7.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 
2768–69 (2014) (discussing the applicability of the RFRA).   
 8.  134 S. Ct. 2751. 
 9.  Id. at 2759. 
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free exercise rights.  Part III suggests how courts should critically evaluate 
the telescoping and collectivizing of free exercise rights.  This Paper con-
cludes with a warning about the danger that can accompany insufficient 
consideration of the telescoping and collectivizing of free exercise rights 
through entities. 
I.  RECENT SUPREME COURT RELIGIOUS EXERCISE CASES 
The Supreme Court has recently decided three religious exercise cases 
that illustrate the drift toward allowing individuals and entities to decide 
what laws will apply to them based on religious belief.  In Holt v. Hobbs,10 
plaintiff Holt sued, arguing that the prison’s rule that prisoners remain 
clean-shaven violated his right to practice his religion.11  Hosanna-Tabor 
Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC12 involved a church 
school that wished to avoid the strictures of federal employment discrimina-
tion laws when firing a teacher.13  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores Inc.14 in-
volved for-profit corporations owned by devout Christians that sought to 
avoid Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) regulations that 
required certain employers to provide certain forms of contraception 
through their insurance plans.15  In each case, the government lost and the 
Court limited the ways the government could enforce its rules or laws. 
A.  Holt v. Hobbs 
In Holt, plaintiff Holt, an Arkansas prisoner, sued to protect his right 
to keep his beard uncut, consistent with his religious beliefs.16  The prison 
where Holt was housed required that prisoners be clean-shaven, unless the 
prisoner had a dermatological condition.17  Inmates with such a condition 
could wear quarter-inch beards.18  Holt offered to keep a half-inch beard as 
a compromise.19  The warden declined the offer and pledged to enforce the 
rule.20  Holt sued.21 
                                                          
 10.  135 S. Ct. 853 (2015). 
 11.  Id. at 860–61. 
 12.  132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). 
 13.  See id. at 699. 
 14.  134 S. Ct. 2751.  
 15.  See id. at 2764–66. 
 16.  Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 861 (2015). 
 17.  Id. at 859. 
 18.  Id. at 861. 
 19.  Id.  
 20.  Id.  
 21.  Id.  
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Applying the RLUIPA, the Supreme Court found for Holt.22  The 
RLUIPA requires that any action by a state or local government that sub-
stantially burdens the religious practice of an institutionalized person must 
be “the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental in-
terest.”23  Holt argued that he sincerely believed, based on his religion, that 
he was required to leave his beard unshaven.24  The state did not dispute the 
sincerity of Holt’s belief regarding his religious obligation to remain un-
shaven, but did note that not all Muslims believe that their faith requires 
that men be unshaven.25  The Court addressed the state’s argument by not-
ing that a religious practice need not be “compelled by or central to a sys-
tem of religious belief” to be an exercise of religion covered by RLUIPA.26  
Holt’s exercise of religion—not shaving his beard—was substantially bur-
dened because he would have been disciplined had he refused to shave his 
beard.27  Though the Court found that the state’s interest in prison safety 
and controlling contraband was a compelling state interest, the Court also 
found that the state’s solution—the requirement that prisoners be clean 
shaven—was not the least restrictive means of furthering that interest.28  
Consequently, Holt prevailed. 
The Holt Court’s analysis provided a standard application of RLUIPA 
to an individual’s exercise of religion claim.  The government refused to al-
low Holt to engage in a religious practice.  RLUIPA required that the gov-
ernment justify its action.  The government could not do so, and it lost.  
Simply stated, RLUIPA expands the protection for an individual’s free ex-
ercise rights more broadly than the Free Exercise Clause does.29 
B.  Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Church and School v. EEOC 
Hosanna-Tabor involved the exercise of religious rights through a 
church and church-affiliated school.30  In that case, plaintiff Cheryl Perich, 
a commissioned minister and teacher at the school, argued that she had been 
                                                          
 22.  Id. at 867. 
 23.  Id. at 859. 
 24.  Id. at 861. 
 25.  Id. at 862. 
 26.  Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–5(7)(A) (2012)); see also Davis v. Fort Bend Cnty., 765 
F.3d 480, 485 (5th Cir. 2014) (noting that courts cannot inquire into whether a religious belief is 
“central to the religion” or “a true religious tenet”). 
 27.  Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 862 (noting that the key issue is whether this practice was substantially 
burdened, not whether his exercise of religion, broadly construed, was substantially burdened by 
not being allowed to keep a one-half inch beard). 
 28.  Id. at 863–64. 
 29.  For a discussion of RLUIPA’s relationship to the free exercise clause, see id. at 859–60. 
 30.  The church operated the school.  Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. 
v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 699 (2012).  However, the school had its own board of directors.  Id. at 
699–700. 
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fired by her Lutheran church school in violation of the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act (“ADA”) because she demanded to be allowed to return to 
work after a medical leave.31  Perich had been on leave during the school 
year after being diagnosed with narcolepsy.32  After being cleared to return 
to work and requesting to return, Perich was told that she had to remain on 
leave for the remainder of the school year.33  After receiving that infor-
mation, renewing her desire to return, and being told the she would likely 
be fired if she did not relent, Perich threatened to sue.34  The church con-
gregation then severed ties with Perich by rescinding her call to minister at 
the church.35  The next day, she was fired from the school as a teacher.36 
The school argued that the ADA did not apply to the situation because 
the plaintiff was a minister subject to the ministerial exception.37  Though 
not codified, the ministerial exception bars employment discrimination suits 
filed by a minister challenging a termination by the minister’s religious em-
ployer.38  The exception is an outgrowth of the First Amendment’s limita-
tion on the government’s regulation of the affairs of religious entities.39  
The Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses limit governmental interfer-
ence in a church’s choice of its ministers, including the application of laws 
that would force churches to keep ministers or encourage the churches to do 
so by allowing compensation for discrimination.40  Such employment dis-
crimination statutes deprive the employer of its freedom to freely control 
“those who will personify its beliefs,” and must yield.41  Consequently, a 
religious employer may fire one of its ministers for any reason without re-
gard to employment discrimination statutes that would otherwise limit such 
termination.42 
A key issue in Hosanna-Tabor was whether the ministerial exception 
applied to Perich or her teaching position.  Perich argued that even though 
                                                          
 31.  Who fired Perich is unclear.  The Court deems the church to have fired Perich, but the 
chairman of the school’s board was involved in the firing.  See id. at 700, 710. 
 32.  Id. at 700. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id.  
 36.  Id.  
 37.  Id. at 701.  For a broader discussion of the ministerial exception, see Christopher C. 
Lund, In Defense of the Ministerial Exception, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2011). 
 38.  Id. at 710. 
 39.  Id. at 705–06.  
 40.  Id. at 702 (“Both Religion Clauses bar the government from interfering with the decision 
of a religious group to fire one of its ministers.”).  Whether ministers can sue their churches in 
contract or tort based on their employment relationship is unsettled. See Douglas Laycock, Hosan-
na-Tabor and the Ministerial Exception, 35 HARV. J. L. PUB. POL. 839, 861-62 (2012).  
 41.  Id. at 706. 
 42.  Id. at 710. 
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she was a minister, her teaching job was not necessarily a position to which 
the ministerial exception should apply.43  When Perich began teaching at 
Hosanna-Tabor, she was a lay teacher.44  After meeting certain academic 
requirements and receiving her call to minister at Hosanna Tabor, she was 
commissioned as a minister.45 She then became a “called” teacher at the 
school.46  Thereafter, in essence, she was a minister who taught in the 
school.  The teaching position required that she provide some religious in-
struction to students, but the position did not require that its holder be a 
commissioned minister.47  Indeed, Perich was replaced by a lay teacher.48  
However, the nature of the teaching job did not appear to matter much in 
this context.  Though the Court discussed Perich’s job duties and her teach-
ing position, it focused on the fact that Perich was a minister.  Accordingly, 
the Court decided that Perich was a minister who necessarily was covered 
by the ministerial exception.49 
The Court suggested that Hosanna-Tabor merely involved a church 
firing a minister, an easy case under the ministerial exception.50  Certainly, 
the Hosanna-Tabor congregation had a free exercise right to rescind 
Perich’s call to minister at the parish and effectively fire her as one of its 
ministers.  However, the case can be as easily understood as involving a 
church school firing a teacher.51 Perich arguably served both as a minister 
and as a lay teacher.  Before Perich was called to the parish, she served in 
her position as a lay teacher.  When Perich took medical leave, her job was 
filled by a lay teacher.  Consequently, it is not clear that Perich should have 
had to retain her call to the parish to retain the teaching position.  Perich 
clearly was a minister, and her skills and training as a minister presumably 
allowed her to function better in her role as a teacher at the school.  Howev-
er, whether Perich should have been considered a minister who was fired or 
a schoolteacher who was fired is a contested question.52  The Court did not 
                                                          
 43.  The Court struggled over that issue.  See id. at 707–09.  
 44.  Id. at 700. 
 45.  Id. at 699–700; see also Laycock, supra note 40, at 840-41 (discussing the role commis-
sioned ministers play in the Lutheran Church). 
 46.  Id. at 700. 
 47.  Id. at 708. 
 48.  Id. at 700. 
 49.  Id. at 710. 
 50.  Id. (“The case before us is an employment discrimination suit brought on behalf of a min-
ister, challenging her church’s decision to fire her.”). 
 51.  Lay teachers and called teachers generally had the same duties.  See id. at 700.  
 52.  The Court suggested that determining the positions that are subject to the ministerial ex-
ception is not a mechanical process based merely on a job description or job functions.  See id. at 
708.  
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decide whether the position was ministerial, focusing instead on whether 
Perich was a minister.53 
The ministerial exception is about more than whether the employee is 
an ordained or commissioned minister.  One need not be ordained to serve 
in a role covered by the ministerial exception.54  The exception may also 
relate directly to the position the terminated employee held.  How the Court 
decides what positions are covered by the ministerial exception and whether 
it should cede the coverage decision to the religious organization is im-
portant.55  If a church-related employer can describe nearly all of its em-
ployees as ministers and if the inquiry into the employer’s justification for 
doing so is limited, the employer’s decision regarding who is a minister will 
govern in most situations.  If so, Hosanna-Tabor functionally allows a 
church school to decide when the ADA applies to it. 
Unfortunately, the Court appeared to give little thought to whether 
there was a difference between the congregation’s right to rescind Perich’s 
call as a minister and the school’s right to fire her as a teacher.56  That dis-
tinction may not appear to matter much.  However, given that Perich’s 
claims related to matters of disability discrimination, rather than to matters 
of religious discrimination or doctrine, the distinction may be as much a 
matter of allowing the church school to choose whether the employment 
discrimination law will apply to it than it is a matter of allowing a church or 
its affiliated entity to engage in the free exercise of religion.57 
C.  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. 
At issue in Hobby Lobby was whether the free exercise rights of close-
ly held, for-profit corporations requires that such corporations be exempted 
from certain parts of the ACA.  After the ACA’s passage, the Department 
                                                          
 53.  See id. at 708 (“We express no view on whether someone with Perich’s duties would be 
covered by the ministerial exception in the absence of the other considerations we have dis-
cussed.”). 
 54.  See, e.g., Cannata v. Catholic Diocese of Austin, 700 F.3d 169, 180 (5th Cir. 2012) (find-
ing music director to be a minister); see also Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 711 (Alito, J., concur-
ring) (suggesting that ordination cannot be the key to finding that someone is a minister for pur-
poses of the ministerial exception and that job function is more important).  
 55.  See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710 (Thomas, J., concurring) (suggesting that the First 
Amendment “require[s] civil courts to apply the ministerial exception and to defer to a religious 
organization’s good-faith understanding of who qualifies as its minister”). 
 56.  Id. at 710 (deeming the case to be about a church firing a minister). 
 57.  Title VII specifically allows certain religious employers to discriminate in employment 
on the basis of religion.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2014); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) 
(2014) (allowing religious discrimination in certain circumstances).  Not only can a religious or-
ganization fire or refuse to hire an employee whose religious beliefs are inconsistent with the or-
ganization’s, an employee may be barred from suing for harassment or retaliation based on reli-
gion.  See Kennedy v. St. Joseph’s Ministries, Inc., 657 F.3d 189 (4th Cir. 2011).  
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of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) developed regulations specifying 
the benefits, including contraceptive benefits, covered employers must pro-
vide under the ACA through the employer’s insurance plans.58  HHS ex-
empted some religious, non-profit employers—but no for-profit corpora-
tions—from the regulations.59  The plaintiffs, all closely held, for-profit 
companies, argued that providing or being involved in providing some of 
the required forms of contraception would substantially burden their exer-
cise of religion.60  Each plaintiff-employer company had been founded by 
individuals or families with strong religious beliefs and had been operated 
consistent with those beliefs.61  The Court held that the corporations were 
exempt from the HHS regulations.62 
The case was decided under RFRA rather than directly under the First 
Amendment.63  RFRA protects a person’s (including a corporation’s) exer-
cise of religion; it does not distinguish between non-profit and for-profit 
corporations.64  Substantively, RFRA and RLUIPA are analyzed in the 
same way.65  The government violates RFRA when it substantially burdens 
a corporation’s exercise of religion, but fails to demonstrate that its actions 
are both supported by a compelling governmental interest and represent the 
least restrictive means of effectuating the interest.66  After acknowledging 
that protecting the free exercise rights of the corporations is shorthand for 
protecting the rights of the owners of the corporations,67 the Court deter-
mined that the corporations’ exercise of religion had been substantially lim-
ited by being forced to provide the forms of contraception at issue.68  
Though the Court assumed that the HHS regulations were justified by a 
compelling governmental interest, it found that the regulations were not the 
                                                          
 58.  See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2762–63 (2014). 
 59.  Id. at 2762–64. 
 60.  Id. at 2765–66. 
 61.  Id. at 2764–66. 
 62.  Id. at 2759 (“We hold that the regulations that impose this obligation violate RFRA, 
which prohibits the Federal Government from taking any action that substantially burdens the ex-
ercise of religion unless that action constitutes the least restrictive means of serving a compelling 
government interest.”). 
 63.  Id. at 2759. 
 64.  Id. at 2768–71. 
 65.  See Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 860 (2015) (noting that RFRA and RLUIPA are to be 
interpreted in the same manner). 
 66.  See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2767 (“RFRA prohibits the ‘Government [from] substan-
tially burden[ing] a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general 
applicability’ unless the Government ‘demonstrates that application of the burden to the person—
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of 
furthering that compelling governmental interest.’” (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1(a), (b))). 
 67.  Id. at 2768. 
 68.  Id. at 2775–79. 
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least restrictive means of furthering the government’s interests and invali-
dated them as they applied to the plaintiff corporations.69 
Telescoping illuminates Hobby Lobby.  The owners’ free exercise 
rights were telescoped such that the corporate rights were acknowledged to 
be the owners’ individual free exercise rights that were being exercised by 
the corporation on the owners’ behalf.70  At its starkest, Hobby Lobby al-
lowed the owners of closely held corporations to choose which law would 
apply to their for-profit corporations based on the owners’ religious devo-
tion.  However, Hobby Lobby may not be the end of the issue regarding an 
owner’s latitude to exercise free exercise rights through its corporation.71  
The dissent suggested Hobby Lobby provides no clear end to an owner’s 
power to decide what governmental actions its corporation need not follow 
when such government actions conflict with the owner’s religious beliefs.72 
D.  Summary 
Taken together, Holt, Hosanna-Tabor, and Hobby Lobby suggest that a 
different set of laws may apply to the faithful and their corporations than to 
the general population.  That is not necessarily surprising in a society that 
protects religious devotion.  If religious devotion is to be fully protected by 
the government, the law may be required to yield when such devotion con-
flicts with the law.  However, the cases do not appear to provide a clear 
stopping point for when the law must yield.  In all three cases, the party that 
wanted to avoid the application of laws or rules based on its desire to exer-
cise religious rights won.  However, the nature of the claim of religious de-
votion and exemption from government action or law differed depending on 
the collectivization and telescoping at issue. 
In Holt, the individual plaintiff objected to the application of the prison 
rules.  Losing would have restricted his exercise of core faith values in a di-
rect and personal manner.  No collectivization or telescoping was necessary.  
Hosanna-Tabor allowed a church school to object to having its decision to 
fire one of its teachers reviewed.  A loss for Hosanna-Tabor would have re-
quired that the church school justify its firing of the teacher, just as a non-
                                                          
 69.  Id. at 2781–82.  
 70.  Id. at 2768 (“[P]rotecting the free-exercise rights of corporations like Hobby Lobby, 
Conestoga, and Mardel protects the religious liberty of the humans who own and control those 
companies.”). 
 71.  For a broader discussion of Hobby Lobby’s possible implications, see Terri R. Day, Leti-
cia M. Diaz & Danielle Weatherby, A Primer on Hobby Lobby: For-Profit Corporate Entities’ 
Challenge to the HHS Mandate, Free Exercise Rights, RFRA’s Scope, and the Nondelegation 
Doctrine, 42 PEPP. L. REV. 55 (2014). 
 72.  Justice Ginsburg noted that it was unclear whether the owners could decline to provide 
other medical care on religious grounds, such as blood transfusions.  Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 
2805 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).   
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religious school would have been required to do.  The decision relied on the 
collectivization of parishioners’ free exercise rights in a church and the tele-
scoping of those rights through the church-affiliated school.  In Hobby Lob-
by, the corporations’ owners objected to the application of a law that of-
fended their religious sensibilities.  The owners suggested that a loss would 
have required them to violate their deeply held religious beliefs.  The own-
ers’ free exercise rights were telescoped through the corporation.73  The 
owners may be correct that applying the law to their corporations is the 
same as burdening their free exercise rights directly, but their claim ought 
to require significant justification.  These three Supreme Court cases raise 
the questions of whether and when the collectivization and telescoping of 
free exercise rights is sensible.  Part II takes a closer look at the collectivi-
zation and telescoping of such rights. 
II.  COLLECTIVIZING AND TELESCOPING FREE EXERCISE RIGHTS 
Free exercise is most easily understood as the exercise of an individu-
al’s right to practice religion.  The idiosyncratic nature of religious belief 
and practice should make protecting free exercise rights a personal affair.  
Consequently, telescoping and collectivizing free exercise rights so that en-
tities appear to exercise religious rights directly is problematic.  Allowing a 
group of individuals to telescope their free exercise rights through an entity 
may be troublesome unless the entity was created to facilitate the exercise 
of such rights and individuals use the entity explicitly to exercise such 
rights.  However, that the entity is merely exercising the free exercise rights 
of individuals should remain clear.  That harm to the religious rights of the 
individuals—rather than harm to the prerogatives of the entity—should be 
the measure of harm to free exercise rights must remain clear.  The same is 
true when free exercise rights are collectivized and an entity appears to be 
allowed to exercise such rights on its own.  Harm to the entity’s preroga-
tives may be treated as harm to free exercise rights.  However, the key is 
that harm to the entity’s free exercise rights must necessarily harm the free 
exercise rights of the entity’s adherents.  Both telescoping and collectiviza-
tion are best understood in the context of entities created primarily or solely 
to facilitate the exercise of those free exercise rights, i.e., churches or their 
equivalent. 
                                                          
 73.  However, the Court was unclear at times regarding whether the free exercise rights of the 
individual owners of the companies or the free exercise of the companies’ free exercise rights 
were at issue.  See id. at 2768. 
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A.  Idiosyncracy and Belief 
The idiosyncratic nature of religious belief can make telescoping and 
collectivizing free exercise rights difficult to justify.  A belief need not be 
common to other practitioners of the same religion or to anyone else in or-
der to be protected.74  Indeed, the belief not need be strictly religious.75  It 
merely needs to be sincere and as deeply held as a religious belief.76 
Even when the individuals share common beliefs, individuals can op-
erationalize free exercise in idiosyncratic manners.  Consequently, deter-
mining whether an exercise of governmental power harms an individual’s 
free exercise of religion should be an individualized process.77  For exam-
ple, how precisely the plaintiff in Holt operationalized his free exercise 
rights is unclear, and precisely how the prison’s policy violated his religious 
rights is likewise somewhat unclear.  Holt argued that his religious beliefs 
required that his beard remain uncut.78  However, he was willing to cut his 
beard to one-half inch.  If his sincerely held belief was that he had to leave 
his hair uncut, a half-inch beard would not appear to be consistent with his 
sincerely held belief.  Conversely, if his sincerely held belief was that he 
was merely required to resist cutting his hair as much as practicable, offer-
ing to keep a one-half inch beard or a beard of whatever length he believed 
the warden would allow would appear to be a compromise that might be 
consistent with his sincerely held belief.79  How Holt operationalized his 
free exercise obligations is important.  If forcing Holt to cut his beard to 
one-half inch substantially restricts his exercise of religion—keeping his 
hair uncut—it is unclear that it is a proper solution.  Conversely, if his will-
ingness to keep a beard cut to one-half inch suggests that he may not have a 
sincerely held religious belief that he is not allowed to cut his beard, it is 
not clear that letting him keep a half-inch beard in violation of prison policy 
                                                          
 74.  See Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 862–63 (2015) (noting that even idiosyncratic reli-
gious beliefs that are not held by all members of the faith are protected by RLUIPA and the Free 
Exercise Clause). 
 75.  See, e.g., Chenzira v. Cin. Child. Hosp. Med. Cent., 2012 WL 6721098, *4 (S.D. Ohio 
2012) (noting the possibility that veganism can be protected as a moral or ethical belief akin to a 
religious belief). 
 76.  See Davis v. Fort Bend Cnty., 765 F.3d 480, 485 (5th Cir. 2014) (focusing on whether 
covered beliefs are “moral or ethical beliefs as to what is right and wrong” and are “sincerely held 
with the strength of traditional religious views”); see also Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2778 (noting 
that religious beliefs need not be objectively reasonable to be protected). 
 77.  Indeed, disputes about church doctrine and its application continue, even among clergy 
who presumably share the same religious beliefs and doctrine.  See, e.g., Henry L. Chambers, Jr. 
& Isaac A. McBeth, Much Ado About Nothing Much: Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese 
of Virginia v. Truro Church, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 141, 142–46 (2010) (discussing the Episcopal 
Church’s internal disputes regarding homosexual clergy). 
 78.  Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 861. 
 79.  See id. at 862 (noting that it is possible that duty to religion may have been discharged by 
attempting to adhere to a belief, whether successful or not). 
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is a sensible solution, even if the prison’s rule on beards is unjustifiable.  
How a group of people holding the same belief regarding the need to keep 
their beards uncut would collectively operationalize that religious belief is 
even less clear.80 
Clarity is important if an entity is to exercise the religious rights of a 
group of individuals.  When religious belief conflicts with a generally ap-
plicable law, the precise nature of the belief should be explored, given that 
the law may have to yield.  The refusal to be precise about the nature of a 
religious belief and to ask direct questions about that belief is not a sign of 
respect for the religious belief, but a show of disrespect for the generally 
applicable law—a law that others must follow. 
B.  Telescoping 
Telescoping involves projecting free exercise rights of individuals 
through another entity when it is generally understood that the entity is ex-
ercising the rights of the individuals.  Hobby Lobby is an example of tele-
scoping rights through an entity.81  Telescoping is odd in that if it is clear 
that the rights asserted are those of individuals associated with the entity, 
arguably the individuals should assert their rights on their own.  However, 
telescoping may be efficient.  If those associated with an organization share 
common beliefs and common practices that are operationalized through the 
organization, allowing the organization to be treated as the vessel through 
which religious rights are exercised might be sensible. 
However, given the idiosyncrasy of religious belief, an entity may not 
be protecting the free exercise rights of some of its members when it asserts 
the free exercise rights of other members.  If only half of an entity’s mem-
bers operationalize free exercise rights in a particular way, a law that re-
stricts the manner in which the applicable rights have been operationalized 
only burdens the free exercise rights of half of the entity’s members. None-
theless, if the free exercise rights of some of the entity’s members are vio-
lated, allowing the organization to assert free exercise rights on its mem-
bers’ behalf may be sensible and efficient.  Telescoping may be harmless if 
the focus of assessing the entity’s assertion of rights remains on the free ex-
ercise rights of its individual members. 
C.  Collectivization 
Collectivization occurs when an entity exercises the rights of its mem-
bers or parishioners as the entity’s own rights.  It is more extreme than tele-
                                                          
 80.  The Holt Court suggested that not all Muslims believe their beards must remain uncut, 
but that the belief that one’s beard must be uncut is not idiosyncratic.  See id. at 862–63. 
 81.  See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768. 
 404 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 75:392 
scoping in that collectivization suggests that the free exercise rights at issue 
are the rights of the entity.82  When the government intentionally restricts 
the practices of a collective religious entity, e.g., a church, the direct asser-
tion of free exercise rights by the entity is easy to understand.  However, 
collectivization is more problematic when the entity seeks to avoid the stric-
tures of a generally applicable law. 
Allowing the entity to assert its own rights would appear sensible only 
if its members operationalize free exercise in the same way.  If only some 
portion of the entity’s membership’s free exercise rights are affected by the 
law, the church is actually telescoping the rights of some parishioners rather 
than collectivizing the rights of all parishioners.  Nonetheless, collectiviza-
tion might cause little harm if the entity is a church or similar organization. 
Collectivizing the free exercise rights of parishioners in a church may 
be sensible if there is a shared doctrine or shared free exercise practice that 
can be discerned.  The key is that parishioners adhere to the church and its 
doctrine.  When a church has been created or maintained to facilitate its pa-
rishioners’ free exercise rights, a church’s members presumably adhere to 
the church’s doctrine.83  Individual members of the church may operational-
ize church doctrine in various ways, but it is the church’s doctrine that they 
are trying to apply.  To the extent that free exercise is about protecting the 
religious beliefs an individual holds and the religious practices an individu-
al engages in, collectivizing the free exercise rights of followers of the same 
church or religion seems reasonable.  A parishioner may disagree with 
church doctrine, but any disagreement between an adherent’s interpretation 
of church doctrine and actual church doctrine reflects the adherent’s per-
sonal belief, which will be protected separately by free exercise doctrine.  
Even if one believes that a church should technically have no real free exer-
cise rights of its own, collectivizing parishioners’ free exercise rights and 
allowing a church to exercise those rights collectively may be sensible.  A 
court could treat the existence of a church’s free exercise rights as a recog-
nition that individual parishioners adhere to church doctrine and wish to ex-
ercise their free exercise rights through the church. 
D.  Corporate Entities and Free Exercise Rights 
The Hobby Lobby Court suggests that free exercise rights that are pro-
vided to some entities can be provided to any entity on similar terms and in 
                                                          
 82.  See, e.g., id. at 2794–95 (focusing directly on the church’s religious rights rather than the 
religious rights of parishioners); Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. EEOC, 
132 S. Ct. 694, 706 (2012) (suggesting that a church can hold and exercise religious rights). 
 83.  See Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Slavery, Free Blacks, and Citizenship, 43 RUTGERS L.J. 487, 
493–94 (2013) (discussing adherence and church membership). 
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similar situations.84  Consequently, providing free exercise rights to a 
church school, like Hosanna-Tabor, may be similar to providing free exer-
cise rights to a for-profit corporation owned by devout Christians, like 
Hobby Lobby.  The argument that corporate form does not matter, so that 
incorporated churches and unincorporated churches will be treated the 
same, is sensible.  The argument that all corporate entities have the same 
capacity to exercise religion because some corporate entities do is weaker.85  
Justifying the telescoping or collectivization of the free exercise rights of 
church members in a church is easier than justifying the telescoping or col-
lectivization of the free exercise rights of owners of a for-profit business in 
that business.86 
Theoretically, a corporation could be treated just like a church, as a re-
ceptacle for free exercise rights.  However, for-profit corporations are not 
created primarily to facilitate the owners’ free exercise rights; they reflect 
the owners’ free exercise rights.87  The owners do not adhere to the corpora-
tion in the manner that congregants adhere to their church.  Rather, the cor-
poration adheres to its owners and changes whenever, and however, the 
owners require.88  The corporation’s actions may reflect the owners’ devo-
tion to religious principles, but the corporation does not exist to facilitate 
the owners’ free exercise of religion.  Given that, there is little need or justi-
fication to telescope or collectivize free exercise rights.  Rarely, if ever, 
should a for-profit business be considered to be exercising its own free ex-
ercise rights, rather than merely asserting the disparate and possibly incon-
sistent free exercise rights of its owners and members as individuals. 
Corporate telescoping or collectivization of religious rights would 
seem to rest on the notion that the religious beliefs of multiple owners can 
be identified and transmitted to a corporate body as a single-belief structure.  
That is unlikely.  Surely, the general religious views of all owners may be 
sufficiently consistent for all to agree to a particular corporate policy.89  
However, that does not mean that the owners share specific beliefs so com-
                                                          
 84.  See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2769–73 (explaining that for-profit and non-profit corpo-
rations alike are covered by RFRA and its protection of the exercise of religion). 
 85.  See id. at 2769–70 (suggesting that both for-profit and non-profit corporations can exer-
cise religion). 
 86.  See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. 
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 342 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“For many individuals, religious activ-
ity derives meaning in large measure from participation in a larger religious community.  Such a 
community represents an ongoing tradition of shared beliefs, an organic entity not reducible to a 
mere aggregation of individuals.”). 
 87.  See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768. 
 88.  See id. (“Corporations, ‘separate and apart from’ the human beings who own, run and are 
employed by them, cannot do anything at all.” (quoting Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. 
Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 385 (3d Cir. 2013))).  
 89.  See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2771. 
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pletely that they can speak with one voice consistently on free exercise is-
sues. 
The problems of telescoping or collectivization are acute when the en-
tity has multiple members or owners, but some of these conceptual prob-
lems would exist even if there were a single owner or member.  The own-
er’s rights must be managed by agents and employees of the corporation.90  
Whether the rights were asserted properly would depend on how well the 
agents and employees knew the owner’s religious beliefs and how that 
knowledge translated into policy or day-to-day operations.  If agents mis-
perceive the substance of the owners’ religious views, religious rights can-
not be operationalized accurately.  Any mismatch is problematic because 
the basis for allowing free exercise rights to trump a law is that the law im-
permissibly restricts the owner’s specific operationalizing of religious exer-
cise.91  Looking to a restriction on the entity’s exercise of religion, as in 
Hobby Lobby, to determine whether the owner’s free exercise rights have 
been violated may not be sensible.   
Nonetheless, telescoping free exercise rights could be harmless if the 
focus remains on the free exercise rights of the individual owner.  If courts 
ask those members who want to enforce their free exercise rights through 
their corporation precisely how their free exercise rights are harmed by lim-
iting the prerogatives of the corporation, and if the courts closely analyze 
the answers, allowing telescoping may not be harmful, though it may prove 
to be largely pointless.92 
E.  Summary 
The collectivizing and telescoping of religious rights may seem sensi-
ble, as these actions merely reflect the notion that individuals have free ex-
ercise rights that may be affected if entities with which they are associated 
are harmed.  Nonetheless, courts should be careful to consider collectiviza-
tion and telescoping for what they are—shorthand for protecting individual 
free exercise rights.  As noted above, collectivization and telescoping may 
be sensible when churches or similar organizations are the entities at issue, 
but may not make much sense if the entities are non-religious.  However, if 
telescoping and collectivization are used to allow both religious and non-
                                                          
 90.  Corporations can act only through their agents and employees.  See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. 
Ct. at 2768; Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 110 (1988).  
 91.  See Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The Problems Inherent in Litigating Employer Free Exercise 
Rights, 86 U. COLO. L. REV. 1141, 1164–66 (2015) (discussing the problems of agents overclaim-
ing free exercise rights on employer’s behalf). 
 92.  This is particularly important because corporations are not generally considered the alter 
ego of their owners.  See Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 166 (2001); see 
also Braswell, 487 U.S. at 104–05  (noting that the owner of corporation and the corporation are 
separate entities for purposes of replying to a subpoena).  
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religious entities to assert free exercise rights, courts must focus specifically 
on how individual rights are affected by the harm visited on the entities. 
III.  MANAGING THE COLLECTIVIZATION AND TELESCOPING OF RIGHTS 
The broad conceptualization of collectivizing and telescoping individ-
ual free exercise rights has created a climate in which many entities can 
claim to exercise free exercise rights.  Cabining these claims before they ef-
fectively become requests by the faithful that any entity with which the 
faithful are associated be exempt from laws that arguably offend the faith-
ful’s religious sensibilities is difficult, but must be done.  The key lies in 
addressing burgeoning claims without limiting the core protection of indi-
vidual free exercise rights.  Resolving the issue may require asking addi-
tional serious and possibly unsettling questions about the nature of the free 
exercise claims being asserted by individuals and related entities. 
A.  Direct Exercise of Individual Free Exercise Rights 
When individuals exercise free exercise rights directly, as in Holt v. 
Hobbs, neither collectivization nor telescoping occurs.  The proper breadth 
of the protection of the individual’s free exercise rights remains an open 
question, but that is not related to collectivizing or telescoping such rights.  
The protection provided to religious beliefs in Holt and in other cases may 
be broad, but that is arguably consistent with treating religious beliefs as 
personal rights of conscience.  Any argument that Holt allows a religious 
person to have his own set of rules apply to him stems from the nature of 
the protection of religious rights, rather than from collectivizing or telescop-
ing such rights. 
B.  Exercising Individual Free Exercise Rights Through Church or 
Similar Organizations 
Exercising rights through an organization designed to facilitate the ex-
ercise of religious belief, such as a church, can be sensible.  Members of the 
church adhere to church doctrine for purposes of the church’s exercise of 
the free exercise rights.  However, the focus should generally remain on the 
free exercise of the rights of members, rather than on the free exercise rights 
of the church.  Nonetheless, in practice, when the application of a law or its 
avoidance is at issue, the focus is often on the rights of the church.93 
                                                          
 93.  See, e.g., Alcazar v. Corp. of the Catholic Archbishop of Seattle, 627 F.3d 1288, 1291 
(9th Cir. 2010) (discussing additional cases focusing on the free exercise of churches); Skrzypczak 
v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Tulsa, 611 F.3d 1238, 1243 (10th Cir. 2010) (“The ministerial ex-
ception preserves a church’s “essential” right to choose the people who will ‘preach its values, 
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As noted in Part I, the ministerial exception allows churches to fire 
ministers without providing a reason.  Even if a termination is unrelated to 
religion and was triggered by the discriminatory conduct that the statute at 
issue was meant to address, churches do not have to answer for the firing.94  
In some cases, the discrimination claims involved cannot be heard even 
when they involve employees who are largely engaging in secular tasks or 
tasks that may not require religious training.95  Though it is unclear that the 
firing would comport with any parishioner’s operationalizing of free exer-
cise rights, courts have allowed free exercise rights to justify the refusal to 
review terminations in those situations.  The church’s interests as an em-
ployer may be more relevant than the congregation’s interest in free exer-
cise. 
Presumably, if every parishioner disagreed with the church’s decision 
to fire a person the church deems to be a minister, parishioners would leave 
or attempt to have the church’s decision reversed.  However, rather than re-
ly on parishioner action, courts should consider asking searching questions 
regarding whether the employee who was fired was a minister, whether the 
position in question was ministerial and whether the firing was really con-
sistent with or required by church doctrine.  Doing so might trench on the 
church’s free exercise rights more than courts have in the past, but it may be 
necessary to provide some limitation on religious prerogative.96 
C.  Exercising Free Exercise Rights Through a Church-Affiliated Entity 
 
                                                          
teach its message, and interpret its doctrines, both to its own membership and to the world at 
large,’ free from the interference of civil employment laws.”).  
 94.  See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 
694, 701 (2012); Kirby v. Lexington Theological Seminary, 426 S.W.3d 597, 605 (Ky. 2014) (as-
serting that ministerial exception makes a court incompetent to hear employment discrimination 
claims by ministers against their religious employers). 
 95.  For example, in Cannata v. Catholic Diocese of Austin, 700 F.3d 169 (5th Cir. 2012), the 
music director at a Catholic church was deemed a minister who could be fired without explana-
tion.  Id. at 180; see also EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795, 805 (4th 
Cir. 2000) (deeming the director of music ministry to be a minister).  Consequently, his Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and ADA claims could not be heard.  Cannata, 700 F.3d 
at 170.  Cannata argued that his tasks were largely secular. Id. at 177 (“The crux of Cannata’s ar-
gument is that he merely played the piano at Mass and that his only responsibilities were keeping 
the books, running the sound system, and doing custodial work, none of which was religious in 
nature.  However, the performance of secular duties, the Supreme Court has said, may not be 
overemphasized in the context of the ministerial exception.” (citing Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 
709)). 
 96.  See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 704–05 (discussing the tradition of leaving church doc-
trine to churches).  For an interesting discussion of how the ministerial exception ought to fit with 
religious doctrine, see Caroline Mala Corbin, Above the Law? The Constitutionality of the Minis-
terial Exemption from Antidiscrimination Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1965 (2007). 
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Exercising free exercise rights through a church-affiliated entity in-
volves telescoping a church’s free exercise rights.  Hosanna-Tabor appears 
to be an example.97  In that case, the church school fired a minister-teacher, 
but was not subject to the ADA for the dismissal because of the ministerial 
exception.98  The church school arguably exercised the church congrega-
tion’s right to decide who could minister in the church’s name at the 
school.99  If the school was a ministry of the church, that approach may be 
sensible. 
However, the issue that arises when a church invokes the ministerial 
exception directly arises in this context as well.  The use of the ministerial 
exception can be as consistent with the affiliated entity’s administrative 
convenience as with religious devotion.100  Certainly, in Hosanna-Tabor, 
the church congregation spoke when it rescinded Perich’s call.101  However, 
the congregation did not speak with religion-based clarity about whether 
Perich should remain a teacher at the school.102  In cases like this one, 
courts should seek clarity by distinguishing between the 
church/congregation’s free exercise rights and the church-affiliated entity’s 
rights.  Determining how applying a law to the church-related entity harms 
the church members’ free exercise rights would clarify what rights were vi-
olated and guarantee that collectivizing and telescoping rights in this con-
text would not deform the inquiry regarding the law’s effect on the exercise 
of free exercise rights. 
D.  Exercise of Free Exercise Rights by Unaffiliated Religious 
Organizations 
Religious organizations that are unaffiliated with churches may at-
tempt to exercise religious rights.  That exercise of rights may be problem-
atic because it appears to suggest collectivization or telescoping in a context 
in which neither may be appropriate.  The organization will likely have an 
organizing statement of principles with which members will presumably 
                                                          
 97.  For a discussion of whether Hosanna-Tabor involved the firing of a minister or the firing 
of a teacher, see supra Part I.B.   
 98.  Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710.  
 99.  See id. at 700 (discussing the order of events and role the school’s board played in lead-
ing to the minister’s dismissal). 
 100.  Indeed, the school told plaintiff that it had hired a lay teacher for the remainder of the 
school year and that her position was no longer available.  See id.  Affiliated organizations may 
not need to be religious to be covered by the ministerial exception and similar doctrines.  See 
Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 
U.S. 327 (1987). 
 101.  See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 700. 
 102.  The congregation appeared to have only spoken on rescinding the minister’s call to min-
istry at the church.  See id. 
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agree.103  However, few members are likely to adhere to the statement of 
principles in the way parishioners adhere to church doctrine.  If a substan-
tial proportion of members adheres to the statement of principles, the organ-
ization arguably should be considered a small, independent church rather 
than an unaffiliated religious organization.  If few members adhere to the 
organization’s doctrine, there may be no reason to collectivize the rights of 
members.  Such members, like members of churches, may have very differ-
ent ways of operationalizing their free exercise rights.  More importantly, 
such members—unlike members of churches—are not likely to use the or-
ganization as a vehicle to exercise their free exercise rights.  Under those 
circumstances, there may be little reason to allow the organization to exer-
cise the free exercise rights of its members.  Rather, the organization would 
need to assert its own free exercise rights. 
Allowing an organization to assert religious beliefs expressed through 
its statement of principles that may be agreed to by many members, but not 
adhered to in a religious fashion, is troublesome.  Certainly, an organiza-
tion’s charter may express religious beliefs with which its members agree.  
However, that does not mean that members view the organization as an en-
tity through which to exercise religious rights.  In that case, the application 
of the organization’s principles as deeply held religious beliefs that allow it 
to avoid a law of general applicability would be less about exercising the 
free exercise rights of the organization’s members and more about advanc-
ing the organization’s religious prerogatives. 
Conlon v. InterVarsity Christian Fellowship104 may provide an exam-
ple.  In this case, plaintiff’s sex discrimination claim was dismissed when 
the court determined that her claim was barred by the ministerial excep-
tion.105  Plaintiff had been a spiritual director with defendant Intervarsity 
Christian Fellowship (“IVCF”).  InterVarsity Christian Fellowship is “an 
evangelical campus mission serving students and faculty on college and 
university campuses nationwide.”106  Through its policies and Purpose 
Statement and Doctrinal Basis, IVCF had made clear that it highly valued 
marriage and expected its employees to “honor their marriage vows.”107  
Plaintiff claimed that she was fired for failing to reconcile her marriage, 
even though at least two other “similarly situated male [IVCF] employees 
                                                          
 103.  An organization may have religion-based doctrine that members agree to observe.  See 
Conlon v. Intervarsity Christian Fellowship, 777 F.3d 829, 831 (6th Cir. 2015) (noting IVCF’s 
Purpose Statement and Doctrinal Basis which presumably forms the core of its beliefs).  
 104.  777 F.3d 829 (6th Cir. 2015). 
 105.  Id. at 831. 
 106.  Id.  
 107.  Id.  
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divorced their spouses during their employment, but were not disciplined or 
terminated.”108 
InterVarsity Christian Fellowship claimed that it was a religious or-
ganization and that plaintiff was a minister.109  The Sixth Circuit agreed, 
noting that, even though IVCF is not a church and is not affiliated with a 
church, it is a Christian organization with a Christian mission.110  The court 
deemed IVCF a religious group that could claim the ministerial excep-
tion.111  Consequently, the court held that IVCF, a self-identified Christian 
organization without any formal ties to any church or denomination, could 
choose, through its bylaws and its Purpose Statement and Doctrinal Basis, 
whether Title VII’s sex discrimination provisions would apply to its termi-
nation decision.112 
Courts that provide such organizations access to the ministerial excep-
tion ought to consider asking what makes an unaffiliated organization more 
like a church than like a standard non-profit organization that is influenced 
by religious faith but is not considered a religious organization.  Specifical-
ly, the court should ask whose free exercise rights are being asserted.  If the 
organization cannot find anyone who claims to exercise his or her free exer-
cise rights through the organization, the organization should not be allowed 
to claim to be exercising free exercise rights.  If an individual or group of 
individuals claims to exercise free exercise rights through the organization, 
the court should ask how thir free exercise rights would be harmed by en-
forcing employment discrimination statutes with respect to the entity or by 
not allowing the entity to use the ministerial exception.  If no individual 
could persuasively argue that keeping the plaintiff as a minister violates his 
or her free exercise rights, the organization is presumptively using the min-
isterial exception for its own purposes, rather than for the purposes of its 
members.  That may not be a legitimate use of free exercise protection. 
E.  Exercising Free Exercise Rights Through Non-Religious 
Organizations 
When non-religious organizations enjoy free exercise rights, the organ-
ization exercises the rights of its owners.  Hobby Lobby is the example; its 
deficiencies are clear.  In Hobby Lobby, the Court did not appear to ask the 
                                                          
 108.  Id. at 832.  
 109.  Id. at 833–34. 
 110.  Id. at 834. 
 111.  Id. at 833.  A multidenominational or nondenominational group can be a religious group 
for the purpose of the ministerial exception.  Id. at 834 
 112.  See Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d 299, 310 (4th Cir. 
2004) (deeming a Jewish nursing home unaffiliated with a temple to be a religious organization 
that could claim the ministerial exception based on its bylaws and its attention to Jewish religion). 
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difficult, but necessary, questions regarding how a limitation on the for-
profit corporations harmed the free exercise rights of the its owners.  Not 
asking the questions is of concern because courts need to make a serious in-
quiry into how the owners’ free exercise rights are harmed by the applica-
tion of a law to the owner’s company.  This is different than asking whether 
the owners disagree with the law or are offended by it.  Undoubtedly, ask-
ing questions about the owners’ beliefs might entangle courts with religious 
doctrine issues that courts do not want to consider.  However, if a non-
religious organization claims that a law should yield because the organiza-
tion’s free exercise rights—its owners’ rights—are being harmed, a hard 
look at that claim is reasonable. 
F.  Financial Incentives 
A practical problem accompanies broad notions of the collectivization 
and telescoping of free exercise rights.  Loose notions of collectivization 
and telescoping can lead individuals to attempt to protect their financial in-
terests, rather than merely their spiritual interests, through free exercise 
claims made through entities.113  Asserting religious rights can be financial-
ly valuable for entities, their members, or their owners.114  The ability to 
fire a minister or teacher without concern for violating an employment dis-
crimination statute, as in Hosanna-Tabor, may be valuable.  The value may 
be particularly significant when the religious organization is competing 
with entities that do not have that latitude.115  The ability to refuse to pro-
vide insurance for certain forms of health care, as in Hobby Lobby, may al-
so be valuable.  Even if the employer does not plan to save money through 
the exercise of such rights, if the rights can be asserted without cost, there 
may be an incentive to assert such rights.  If courts are not willing to take a 
hard look at the sincerity of an organization’s or its owners’ beliefs, addi-
tional claims for religious exemption may be made. 
Specifically, additional corporations may begin to request religious 
exemptions.  The Hobby Lobby Court found that a closely held, for-profit 
corporation can exercise religious rights.  The IVCF court appeared to sug-
                                                          
 113.  Some might argue that that already occurred in Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).  
However, that case involved a sole proprietor claiming individual free exercise rights directly ra-
ther than through an entity.  See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2770 
(2014) (discussing Braunfeld). 
 114.  The Braunfeld Court did discuss the effect that laws that unintentionally affect religion 
might have on business competition.  Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 608–09.  
 115.  In Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Washington, Inc., a nursing home was al-
lowed to avoid liability for FLSA claims.  363 F.3d 299, 310 (2004).  Consequently, the plaintiff 
could not recover wages for hours already worked for which he claimed that he was not paid.  The 
ability to designate certain employees who will not be allowed to bring wage-and-hour claims has 
economic value, particularly if one’s competitors cannot do so. 
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gest that a religious organization can exercise religious rights based on its 
nondenominational bylaws and profession of faith.  If IVCF and Hobby 
Lobby can exercise religious rights, there may be no reason why a for-profit 
corporation operated pursuant to religious principles should be unable to 
exercise religious rights merely because of its large number of owners.  
Hobby Lobby justified allowing closely-held, for-profit corporations to ex-
ercise free exercise rights in part because of the small number of owners 
such corporations have.116  Presumably, too many owners would lead to too 
many disagreements regarding religion and the inability to agree on opera-
tionalizing free exercise rights.  However, if religious free exercise rights 
can arise based on bylaws or a charter, there may be little reason why a reg-
ular for-profit corporation with a religious-based charter could not be 
deemed to exercise religious rights.117 
CONCLUSION 
Free exercise is about the freedom and prerogative to exercise religion 
without government intrusion.  Given that the free exercise of religious 
rights is good, individuals arguably should push those rights as far as al-
lowed.  Pushing free exercise rights will, on occasion, become a request that 
a different set of laws apply to the faithful than apply to others.118  Holt, 
Hosanna-Tabor, and Hobby Lobby can be read broadly as suggesting that 
deeply held religious beliefs should trump government regulation in many 
circumstances.119  A fair reading of those cases might encourage individuals 
and entities to exercise their free exercise rights until told to “stop.” 
There must be a stopping point.  This Paper does not suggest where the 
stopping point is.  That is too large a topic for this piece.  Rather, this Paper 
suggests that in order to ensure the expansion of free exercise rights does 
not become a vehicle to allow the faithful to shield their financial interests 
from generally applicable law, additional, uncomfortable questions about 
precisely how the free exercise rights of individuals associated with entities 
are affected by the application of particular laws to such entities  must be 
asked.  Courts should ask those questions.120  The Constitution and statutes 
                                                          
 116.  Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2774. 
 117.  Indeed, Hobby Lobby arguably suggests that.  See id. at 2771–72 (noting that a corpora-
tion focused on religion and profit may already be acceptable under state laws). 
 118.  See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 
(2012) (trumping ADA); Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (trumping Health and Human Services 
regulations promulgated pursuant to the ADA). 
 119.  The Hobby Lobby Court would probably argue otherwise.  Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 
2783 (suggesting that Hobby Lobby is a narrow decision and criticizing the claim that the decision 
could be read broadly to cover additional medical procedures). 
 120.  For a discussion of the difficulty in finding proper answers, see William P. Marshall, 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby: Bad Statutes Make Bad Law, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 71 (2014). 
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like RFRA and RLUIPA should protect religious free exercise rights fierce-
ly, but should make sure that core religious or spiritual beliefs, rather than 
mere financial interests, are the only factors that can trump generally appli-
cable laws. 
 
